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ELDRED V. ASHCROFT: A CRITICAL ANALYSIS
OF THE SUPREME COURT DECISION
"A page of history is worth a volume of logic."'
I. INTRODUCTION

On October 9, 2002, Brewster Kahle parked his green Ford
Aerostar outside the United States Supreme Court building.
Washington D.C. was one of many places where Kahle - armed
with a satellite dish, a laptop, high-speed printer, book cutter and
bookbinder - printed public domain books for free from his
Bookmobile. On his cross-country journey he stopped at public
schools, libraries, universities, mobile home parks, and retirement
homes connecting users to an online library, consisting solely of
public domain works, where they can choose, download and print
a book.
Inside the courthouse, the case of Eldred v. Ashcroft had
convened and oral arguments were underway. The case would
decide how many books would be a part of the Bookmobile's
digital library. At issue in the case, was the Sonny Bono
Copyright Term Extension Act2 ("CTEA") which extended
copyright terms an additional twenty years. If the act was upheld,
the Bookmobile would not have one new book for twenty years.
The CTEA is comprised of four basic provisions that set forth
copyright term extensions, alter transfer rights, create a new

1.New York Trust Co. v. Eisner, 256 US 345, 349 (1921) (Holmes, J).
2. After Sonny Bono's (Songwriter/Congressman) fatal ski accident his
lawmaker colleagues named the bill in his honor. Sonny Bono's widow
completed his term. About the CTEA, she commented, "'Actually, Sonny
wanted the term of copyright protection to last forever. I am informed by staff
that such a change would violate the constitution. I invite all of you to work
with me to strengthen our copyright laws in all of the ways available to us. As
you know, there is also Jack Valenti's proposal for term to last forever less one
day. Perhaps the Committee may look at that next Congress."' 3 MELVILLE
NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT §9.01, at 9-4 n.2 (1963) (quoting 144 Cong

Rec. H9951 (daily ed. Oct 7, 1998) (remarks of Rep. Bono)).
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infringement exception and address division of fees.' In this
regard, it makes the following amendments to the current
Copyright Act of 1976: (1) a work created in 1978 or later is
granted protection for the life of the author plus seventy years; (2)
a work created in 1978 or later that is anonymous, or
pseudonymous, or is made for hire is protected for ninety five
years from publication or one hundred and twenty years from
creation, whichever occurs first; (3) a work created before 1978
receives an extended renewal term of sixty seven years creating a
total of ninety five years of protection.4 The CTEA does not affect
any works that have already fallen into the public domain.
Accordingly, all works in the public domain at the end of 1997
will remain there.' However, works whose copyrights were set to
expire between January 1 st and October 2 7 th of 1998 receive the
twenty-year extension.6 Thus, works authored from 1923 on,
which would initially have begun to fall into the public domain in
1998, will be protected at least until the end of 2018, unless the
copyright is extended again.7
In the era of information, the benefits of an expansive public
domain are easily recognized. The Internet allows users to view
In fact, corporations are
public domain works for free.
establishing digital libraries and archives with the intent of
preserving old classics and making them available to those
otherwise without access to such works. Specifically, these
3. Christina N. Gifford, Note, The Sonny Bono Copyright Extension Act, 30
U. MEM. L. REV. 363, 378 (2000). Only the provision granting a copyright term
extension is addressed in this article.
4. Eldred v. Reno, 239 F.3d 372, 90 (D.C. Cir. 2000). According to
Congressional reports, the purposes of the CTEA are to harmonize U.S.
copyright standards with those set forth by the European Union and to increase
the amount of works in the public domain by providing incentives to create new
works and monetary incentives to preserve existing works. Camila Alarcon,
Legal Update, Eldred v. Ashcroft Challenges the Copyright Term Extension Act
8 B.U. J. Sct. & TECH. L. 713, 714 (2002).
5. Gifford, supra note 3 at 379.
6. Id.
7. Brief for Petitioners at 2, Eldred v. Ashcroft, 123 S. Ct. 769 (2003) (No.
01-618).
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archives provide access to material that libraries generally have a
difficult time finding, acquiring and storing. The archives flourish
with the help of efficient technology and operate solely within the
public domain.
However, on January 15, 2003 the Court found in favor of the
copyright extension under the CTEA, thereby frustrating the goals
of the Bookmobile and other users of public domain works. This
article examines the Supreme Court's decision to uphold the
CTEA in Eldred v. Ashcroft. Part II provides an introduction to
the history of copyright extensions and introduces the process of
judicial review of congressional legislation. Part III explains the
Court's analysis in Eldred v. Ashcrofi. Part IV argues that the
majority's opinion was based on flawed reasoning. In particular,
the Court failed to address the critical issues such as defining the
"limited Times" provision of the Copyright Clause and outlining
the scope of Congress's legislative authority with regards to
copyright. Further, the Court misstates its role by asserting its
inability to second-guess Congress' legislative judgment. Part V
suggests that the resulting ambiguity will negatively impact
copyright holders, even the proponents of the CTEA such as
Disney, and offers a compromise solution.
II. BACKGROUND
Article 1, Section 8, Clause 8 of the United States Constitution
empowers Congress "to promote the Progress of Science and
useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and
Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and
Discoveries. '"8 Since the constitution was ratified, the language of
this clause has remained ambiguous and the enumerated powers of
Congress have remained unclear. However, lawmakers have
agreed upon the general underlying principles of copyright
protection. The Framer's believed that protecting one's creative
work would give the author economic incentive to create

8. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 8. At the time of the framing, "science" meant
knowledge or learning. Brief for Petitioners at 16 n. 4, Eldred (No. 01-618).
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By encouraging the author's economic
additional works. 9
interests, the public would benefit from wider dissemination of
artistic and literary works.'" "Thus, the underlying philosophy of
copyright requires a balancing of two competing interests-the
protection granted to authors must be broad enough to provide
economic incentive, but limited enough to ultimately serve the
public's interest in the widespread dissemination of creative
works."" In other words, authors' works should receive copyright
protection, but only for a specified period of time, so that these
works eventually become free for public use. In maintaining this
balance, Congress has extended the copyright term eleven times in
forty years.12
A. A History of Extensions
The first Copyright Act was established in 1790."3 It provided

9. Gifford, supra note 3 at 373.
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. In 1828, Congress, by private act, extended the copyright in a book of
tables compiled by John Rowlett. Rowlett sought an extension as a means of
recovery for lost money on his first edition because he invested time and money
ensuring the accuracy of the tables. At the time, devoting substantial time and
money to a work was grounds for copyright protection. This doctrine has since
been rejected by the Supreme Court as inconsistent with the Patent and
Copyright Clause and the basis of Rowlett's claim is no longer valid. Congress
has since extended a copyright by private act one other time and the extension
was held invalid. Tyler T. Ochoa, The Anti-Monopoly Origins of the Patent and
Copyright Clause, 84 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC'Y 909, 930 (2002).
13. The Copyright Act of 1790 was entitled "An Act for the Encouragement
of Learning." President George Washington urged Congress in his January
1790 address that legislation promoting science and literature by encouraging
creativity and publishing was their top priority. Congress responded with an
address to the President, "We concur with you in the sentiment that.. .the
promotion of science and literature will contribute to the security of a free
Government; in the progress of our deliberations we shall not lose sight of
objects so worthy of our regard." The Copyright Act of 1790 was signed into
law that same year. Edward Samuels, The Public Domain Revisited, 36 LOY.
L.A. L. REv. 389, 410 (2002).
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for an initial copyright term of fourteen years from the time of
recording 4 with the option of a fourteen-year renewal if the author
survived to the end of the first term. 5 During the initial fourteenyears, the author could assign away his rights for the renewal
period. 6 The Act maintained a balance between exclusive rights
for an author for a specified amount of time and viable avenues to
the public domain. For instance, if the author died during the
initial copyright term, the work fell into the public domain at the
end of the fourteen-year period.
Additionally, if the author
survived the first term but failed to renew, the work fell into the
public domain. 8 This two-tiered system created the likelihood that
authors would not renew their copyrights if their works were not
commercially viable and instead would replenish the public
domain.
In 1831, the initial copyright term was extended to twenty-eight
years from the date of publication with a renewal period of
fourteen years. 9 The purpose of this extension was to ". . .enlarge
the period for the enjoyment of copyright, and thereby to place
authors in this country more nearly upon an equality with authors
in other countries."2 The legislative history reveals that the 1831
extension was also the result of an erroneous belief that copyright
14. In order to trigger copyright protection an author had to first complete
certain recording formalities such as registration, deposit and notice. These
formalities were abandoned in the Copyright Act of 1976 which attaches
copyright protection at the time of creation. This change grants automatic
copyright protection, regardless of the author's intent that the work be protected
or free to the public. See Marci Hamilton, Should U.S. Intellectual Property
Rights
Change
to
Fit
World
Norms?,
at
http://writ.corporate.findlaw.com/hamilton/20010524.html. (May 24, 2001).
15. Jerome N. Epping, Jr., Comment, Harmonizing the United States and
European Community Copyright Terms: Needed Adjustment or Money for
Nothing?, 70 U. CIN L. REV. 651, 655 (1996).
16. Gifford, supra note 3 at 367.
17. Epping, supra note 15 at 655.
18. Id.
19. Epping, supra note 15 at 656. The terms applied to existing works as
well by repealing the Copyright Act of 1790 and applying the terms of the new
Act to existing works. Samuels, supra note 13 at 411.
20. 7 CONG. DEB. APP. CXIX (1830) (statement of Rep. William Ellsworth).

Published by Digital Commons@DePaul, 2016

5

DePaul Journal of Art, Technology & Intellectual Property Law, Vol. 13, Iss. 1 [2016], Art. 7

DEPAULJART. &ENT.LAW

[Vol. XIII:173

was a natural right of the author.2 Despite pressure to establish a
perpetual right, Congress granted only a fourteen-year extension
period.
Similar to the Act of 1790, the renewal period served the valid
purpose of allowing works that were no longer profitable to fall
into the public domain after twenty eight years, assuming that the
author would not pay to renew his rights in an unprofitable work.22
"The structure also gave authors a 'second bite at the apple' if their
works achieved popularity during the first term by allowing them
to renew the copyright on commercially viable works and to
renegotiate licensing terms and conditions of sale."23 However, if
the author did not go through the formalities of renewal the work
fell into the public domain.
Congress again amended copyright duration in 1909 after
insistence by authors that they were outliving their copyrights and
thus receiving insufficient monetary gain for their efforts.24 Many
authors lobbied for a term of life plus fifty years identical to that of
21. Ochoa, supra note 12 at 932. In a report to the Judiciary Committee,
Congressman William W. Ellsworth wrote, "[u]pon the first principles of
proprietorship in property, an author has an exclusive and perpetual right, in
preference to any other, to the fruits of his labor." Id. at 931 (quoting 7 GALES
& SETON'S REGISTER OF DEBATES IN CONGRESS CXX (Dec. 17,
1830); "When the Bill was debated in Congress, Rep. Michael Hoffman of New
York complained that it would 'establish a monopoly of which authors alone
would reap the advantage, to the public detriment.' He noted that patents were
limited in duration to 14 years, and argued: 'So it should be.. with the author or
publisher. There was an implied contract between them and the public. They,
in virtue of their copyright, sold their books to the latter at an exorbitant rate;
and the latter, therefore, had the right to avail themselves of the work, when the
copyright expired.' Ellsworth replied, arguing that the bill would 'enhance the
literary character of the country, by holding forth to men of learning and genius
additional inducements to devote their time and talents to literature and the fine
arts.'
Ellsworth did not explain how this justified the retroactive
extension.. .."ld. at 932 (quoting 7 GALES & SETON'S REGISTER OF
DEBATES at 423 (Jan. 6, 1831).
22. Gifford, supra note 3 at 368.
23. Id.; The Act granted the renewal rights to a surviving spouse or child if
the author died during the initial term. Epping, supra note 15 at 656.
24. Epping, supra note 15 at 656.
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their European counterparts. 5 However, Congress refused the
authors' efforts, fearing that works with little commercial value
would no longer pass into the public domain. Instead, they
extended the renewal period to twenty-eight years thereby granting
a total of fifty-six years of protection.26
By the 1970's, technological advances, not contemplated by
drafters of the original copyright acts, obviated the need for
revision of the current copyright law. In fear of acting too quickly,
Congress examined alternative provisions to the 1909 Act
accounting for the invention of photocopiers, computers and
videocassette recorders and conducted studies of their potential
impact over a twenty-year period. 7
Congressional consideration culminated into the 1976 Copyright
Act, which changed the structure of copyright law. Congress
abandoned the two-tier structure and instead created one fixed
term beginning upon a work's creation. For all works created after
January 1, 1978, the term was set at the life of the author plus fifty
years.28 Works published before 1978 were given a forty-seven
year renewal term, in effect granting protection for a maximum of
seventy-five years after publication, or one hundred years from the
date of creation, whichever occurred first.29 For works made for

25. Gifford, supra note 3 at 368.
26. Epping, supra note 15 at 656. This extension applied to existing works
whose copyright had not yet expired under the Copyright Act of 1831, but did
not apply to works already in the public domain. Samuels, supra note 13 at 412.
A work under the Copyright Act of 1831 only received copyright protection if
the author deposited a copy of the work with the federal government and paid a
fee. Under the 1909 Act an author was eligible for the extended renewal term if
they properly filed an application for renewal with the copyright office. The
CTEA has no such formal requirements of copyright eligibility. Brief for
Petitioners at 31 n. 13, Eldred (No. 01-618).

27. Gifford, supra note 3 at 369.
28. Epping, supra note 15 at 657. Congress concluded that, on average, life
plus fifty years would be equivalent to seventy-five years from publication. For
works produced toward the end of the author's life, protection would last a little
over fifty years, less than the fifty-six year term under the Copyright Act of
1909. Samuels, note 13 at 413.

29. Epping, supra note 15 at 657-58.
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hire, anonymous or pseudonymous works the term was seventyfive years.3"
Interestingly, while the 1976 Act extended the term of protection
for all works, at the same time it decreased the term of protection
for works created but not yet published. Until 1976, copyright was
governed at both the federal and state level.3 Before a work was
published, state common law granted an author an exclusive right
to publish his work.32 This common law copyright in unpublished
works extended in perpetuity until the work was published.3 3 The
new Act preempted state common law copyright in all unpublished
works, subjecting them to the federal provisions, which began
from the date of fixation in a tangible medium of expression,
rather than from publication.34
Older works, which were
unpublished, were automatically restricted from entering the
public domain before December 31, 2002. 3"
To encourage
publication of these works, Congress provided that if such works
were published by 2002, they would be granted additional
protection until 2027.36
Creation and publication of new works and expansion of the
public domain are two policies that run throughout the legislative
history of the copyright acts. However, the importance of the
public domain seemed to decrease with the enactment of the 1976
Act and continued with to decline with the CTEA which affords
authors longer terms of protection and fewer opportunities for
works to enter the public domain. Consider the impact of these
cumulative extensions by following the copyright activity of a
work published in 1940. After publication, it was granted an
30. Brief for Petitioners at 2, Eldred (No. 01-618).
31. Brief for Respondent at 2, Eldred v. Ashcroft, 123 S. Ct. 769 (2003) (No.
01-618)
32. Id.
33. Samuels, supra note 13 at 413.
34. Id. It should be noted that state common law protections still apply to
some types of works. ROCHELLE COOPER DREYFUSS & ROBERTA ROSENTHAL
KWALL,

INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: CASES AND MATERIALS ON TRADEMARK,

COPYRIGHT AND PATENT LAW

233 (Robert C. Clark et al. eds., 1996).

35. Samuels, supra note 13 at 414.
36. Id.
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original term of twenty-eight years from 1940 - 1968 under the
1909 Act provisions. In 1968, its copyright was renewed for
another twenty-eight years which would have expired in 1996.
However, the 1976 revisions added an additional nineteen years,
thereby extending its protection until 2015. Yet again, the CTEA
brought another extension granting this work protection until
2035.37 It is argued that in effect, these subsequent extensions
create a perpetual copyright.
B. JudicialReview of the CTEA
With the enactment of each of the above mentioned extensions,
Congress never placed a timeframe on the constitutional restriction
of "limited Times" in the Copyright Clause. Accordingly,
repeated extensions to term duration have been passed and no
limits have been placed on Congress' authority with respect to
extending terms in the future. As a result, petitioners in Eldred
asked the Court to qualify the Copyright Clause.
The Court has the special role of interpreting the meaning of the
constitution. It has emphasized that they, not Congress, have the
power and the duty to define constitutional words and phrases.38
Generally, constitutional review of a statute requires the Court to
complete three steps - defining terms, identifying the statute's
measures and goals, and comparing what Congress has done with
what Congress has been empowered to do by the constitution.39
First, the Court defines terms in the constitutional clause. For
example, the Trademark cases in 1879 produced a definitional
analysis of portions of the copyright clause. "Writings" was
declared to include original works "founded in the creative powers
of the mind."4 In 1884, the Court defined an "author" as "he
whom anything owes its origin; originator; maker; one who
37. NiMMER supra note 2 , § 9.11(B), at 9-153.
38. Malla Pollack, Dealing with Old Father William, or Moving from
Constitutional Text to Constitutional Doctrine: Progress Clause Review of the
Copyright term Extension Act, 36 LOY. L.A. L. REv. 337, 358 (2002).

39. Id.
40. Id. at 364-365.
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completes a work of science or literature."'"
Second, the Court will assess whether the goal of the legislation
is legitimate, substantial, or compelling.42 The question with
regard to the Copyright Clause is whether Congress used the
proper means (term extension) to achieve a legitimate end
(promoting progress of the Science and the Arts). 13
Third, the Court determines whether Congress has acted within
the scope of its constitutional authority in enacting legislation.'
Here, the key is the level of deference the Court gives to Congress.
The level of deference determines the level of review the court
applies to legislation. The level of review applied determines the
relationship between what Congress has done and what they are
authorized to do."
The Court in the Eldred v. Ashcroft, had an opportunity and a
responsibility to independently review whether the CTEA was
enacted pursuant to Congress' authority under the Copyright
Clause, thereby affirming our constitutional system of checks and
balances.46 The Copyright Clause was drafted with substantial
limitations on congressional power. It is the role of the court to
check Congress' exercise of its copyright power and maintain the
spirit of the clause.
III.

EXPLANATION: ELDRED V. ASHCROFT47

The Court granted certiorari to hear arguments challenging the
constitutionality of the CTEA. Petitioners, corporations and
individuals who used works in the public domain, brought suit
41. Id. at 365.
42.
43.
44.
45.

Id. at 366.
Id. at 367-368.
Pollack,supra note 38 at 369.
Id. Basic levels of review include: rational basis review, intermediate

scrutiny, and strict scrutiny. The Supreme Court has never discussed which
standard of review should be applied to the Copyright Clause. Further
discussion of these constitutional principles is outside the scope of this article.
46. The Court has never held a copyright or patent statute unconstitutional
for violation of the Copyright Clause. Id. at 365.
47. Eldred v. Ashcroft, 123 S. Ct. 769 (2002).
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against the attorney general, limiting their challenge to the
CTEA's copyright extension for published works with existing
copyrights.48 Petitioners decline to challenge CTEA's life plus
seventy years provision for newly created works.
Rather,
petitioners maintain the act's unconstitutionality with respect to
enlarging the term of protection for published works with existing
copyrights. Additionally, petitioners contended that the CTEA is a
content neutral regulation that fails heightened scrutiny.49 The
Court rejected this argument holding that: (1) the CTEA did not
violate the "limited Times" requirement in the Copyright Clause
and (2) the CTEA did not violate petitioners' First Amendment
right of free speech.
In so holding, the Court merely affirmed the lower courts'
rulings. The United States District Court for the District of
Columbia held that the CTEA is not unconstitutional because the
new terms are still limited, not perpetual, and subject to
Congress's discretion." Additionally, the district court held that
the First Amendment does not grant individuals the right to use
others' copyrighted works.5' The Court of Appeals of the District
of Columbia affirmed, finding Congress' use of legislative
authority proper. The appellate court found nothing in the
constitutional text or its history to suggest that, "a term of years for
a copyright is not a limited time if it may later be extended for
another limited time."52 It was also swayed by the policy benefits
of harmonizing United States copyright law with that of the
European Union (EU).53 The appellate court, "'[i]n an era of
48. Petitioners are individuals and businesses that rely on the public domain
for their creative work and livelihood. Lead petitioner, Eric Eldred, is a
noncommercial publisher of existing works and a creator of new derivative
ones. He founded Eldritch Press, an Internet based press that creates and stores
copies of public domain works for the World Wide Web. With new technology
students and scholars are able to search the texts in ways that are not possible in
the printed version. Brief for Petitioners at 5, Eldred (No. 01-618).
49. Eldred, 123 S. Ct. at 775.
50. Id. at 776.
51. Id. at 777.
52. Id.
53. Id.
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multinational publishers and instantaneous electronic transmission,
harmonization in this regard has obvious practical benefits and is a
necessary and proper measure to meet contemporary
circumstances rather than a step on the way to making copyrights
perpetual."'"
A. Opinion of the Supreme Court
The court evaluated arguments in light of prior copyright
legislation. Fore example, the Court noted that Congress has
consistently applied term extensions equally to existing and future
copyrights. The CTEA merely follows the tradition of retroactive
extensions and therefore, the Court concluded, the CTEA's
enactment does not exceed Congress' legislative authority.
1. Retroactive Extensions
The Court interpreted the Copyright Clause as giving authority
to Congress to prescribe copyright protection for "limited Times"
to all copyright holders, present and future. 5 Petitioners argued
that the term extension qualifies as a "limited Tim[e]" for future
copyrights but not for existing ones. The Court contended that
petitioners' argument "reads into the text of the Copyright Clause
the command that a time prescription, once set, becomes forever
'fixed' or 'inalterable."' 56 The Court disagreed, defining "limited"
as "confined within certain bounds."57 Thus, the court held, the
"limited Times" clause does not preclude Congress from extending
a copyright term; even for a work that has already enjoyed the
benefits of a prior copyright extension.
Additionally, legislative history has proven that Congress has
applied copyright extensions retroactively in prior copyright acts.
Since 1790, Congress's position has remained that authors who
created or published before the new statute was enacted should not
54.
55.
56.
57.

Id.
Eldred, 123 S.Ct. at 778.
Id.
Id.
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be any worse off than authors who created or published after the
statute's enactment.58
The Court also found patent law significant to this inquiry
because the patent power is derived from the same constitutional
provision as copyright. Precedent revealed that the Court has not
encountered a "limited Times" barrier to extending patent
protection. 9 Specifically, in McClurg v. Kingsland,6° the court
upheld the application of expanded patent protection to an existing
patent.6' Therefore, the Court rejected petitioner's argument that
extending the duration of existing copyrights is beyond Congresss'
authority.
2. RationalExercise of Legislative Authority
Content that the CTEA did not violate the "limited Times"
clause, the Court considered whether the act constituted a rational
The Court responded by
exercise of legislative authority.
deferring to Congress' legislative judgment in enacting the CTEA.
First, the extension's purpose was to ensure that American authors
would receive the same copyright protection European authors
enjoyed in Europe and to provide incentives for foreigners to
create in the United States. The European Union passed a
directive that established a life plus seventy years copyright term
for EU members. Additionally, the directive instructed members to
deny the extended term to works of any non-EU country whose
laws set forth a different term.62
In addition to international concerns, longer terms would give
incentive to authors to restore their existing works for public
distribution. Congress ". . .expressed the view that as a result of
increases in human longevity and in parent's average age when
their children are born, the pre-CTEA term did not adequately
58. Id.

59. Id at 779.
60. Id at 780. (citing McClurg v. Kingsland, I How. 202, 11 L.Ed. 102
(1843)).
61. Eldred, 123 S. Ct. at 780.
62. Id. at 781.
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secure 'the right to profit from licensing one's work during one's
lifetime and to take pride and comfort in knowing that one's
children - and perhaps their children - might also benefit from
one's posthumous popularity.'" 6 3 Longer terms equal larger profits

from royalties for the copyright holder. For the above policy
reasons, the Court should not have held that the CTEA is an
impermissible exercise of Congress's power.
3. Interpretingthe "limited Times" Clause
The Court also rejected petitioner's argument that even if life
plus seventy years is a "limited Time," the cumulative effect of
continuous extensions creates a perpetual copyright thereby
violating the "limited Times" provision.' The Court emphasized
that petitioners failed to adequately distinguish between the
unconstitutionality of the CTEA and the constitutionality of the
extensions under the 1831, 1909, and 1976 Copyright Acts.
Justice Ginsburg concluded, "[t]hose earlier acts did not create
perpetual copyrights, and neither does the CTEA."
4. Considerationfor Existing Copyrights
Petitioners argued that the extension is inapplicable to existing
works because the author gives no new consideration in exchange
for increased protection.65 In particular the CTEA (1) overlooks
the originality requirement; (2) fails to further Science and the
Arts; and (3) ignores copyright's quid pro quo. 66
i. The OriginalityRequirement
Petitioners argued that copyright protection is only granted to

63. Id. at 782 n. 14 (citing 141 CONG. REc. 6553 (1995) (statement of Sen.
Feinstein)).
64. Id. at 783.
65. Id.
66. Id at 784.
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works with sufficient originality.67 "Relying on Feist, petitioners
urged that even if a work is sufficiently 'original' to qualify for
copyright protection in the first instance, any extension of the
copyright's duration is impermissible because, once published, a
work is no longer original."68 However, the majority rejected this
argument because Feist addressed a work's eligibility for
copyright protection; not the duration for which an original work
may be protected. Therefore, new consideration is not a necessary
requirement in order to receive extended protection.
ii. Fails to FurtherScience and the Arts
Petitioners contended that "limited Times" must be determined
in light of copyright's policy to "promote the Progress of Science
and the useful Arts." They argued that the extension fails to
promote copyright policy because the CTEA does not encourage
the creation of new works "but merely adds value to works already
created."69 The Court agreed that promoting the progress of
science and the arts is the Copyright Clause's objective; however,
the Court concluded that it is the role of Congress, not the Court,
to determine how best to pursue constitutional objectives.7"
iii. Quid Pro Quo

Petitioners argued that granting copyright protection is
contingent upon the exchange of a writing.71 They maintained that
extending an existing copyright without demanding additional
consideration unjustly enriches copyright holders and their heirs,

67. "Original, as the term is used in copyright, means only that the work was
independently created by the author (as opposed to copied from other works),
and that it possess at least some minimal degree of creativity." Feist Publ'ns,
Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 345 (1991).
68. Eldred, 123 S. Ct. at 784.

69. Id.
70. Id. at 785.
71. Id. at 786.
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violating the quid pro quo requirement.7 ' The Court acknowledged
73
that the quid pro quo standard is significant in patent law.
However, the Court concluded, the differences between patent and
copyright make such a requirement inapplicable in the copyright
context. For example, the fact that disclosure is exacted from the
patentee whereas disclosure is the desired objective of the
copyright holder explains patent law's quid pro quo requirement.7 4
A further distinction is that copyright does not give the holder a
monopoly on knowledge; rather, a reader may use any fact or idea
within a writing.7 5 By contrast, patents prevent the use of the
inventor's knowledge. 76 As a result, the Court counseled that one
could not take language from one of the Court's patent decisions
and use it to support petitioners' view. Consequently, the quid pro
quo requirement does not bar Congress from extending
evenhandedly existing and future copyrights.
5. Freedom of Speech
Alternatively, petitioners argued that the CTEA is a content
neutral regulation of speech that fails strict scrutiny review under
the First Amendment because the CTEA substantially burdens
7
speech without advancing any important governmental interest.
However, the Court observed that the First Amendment and the
Copyright Clause were adopted "close in time," therefore the
Court concluded that the Framers understood copyright's limited
monopolies as consistent with free speech. 78 The Court noted that
72. Id.
73. Id. at 787. The Court provided the following examples: Brenner v.
Manson, 383 US 519, 534 (1996) ("The basic quid pro quo.., for granting a
patent monopoly is the benefit derived by the public from an invention with
substantial utility."); J.E.M. Ag Supply, Inc. v. Pioneer Hi-Bred Int'l, Inc. 534
US 124, 142 (2001) ("The disclosure required by the Patent Act is the quid pro
quo of the right to exclude.").
74. Eldred, 123 S. Ct. at 787.
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Id. at 788.
78. Id. (quoting Harper & Row, 471 U.S. 539, 558 (1985). "[T]he Framers
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copyright law accommodates First Amendment principles in
several ways.79 First, copyright only protects expression and not
ideas, thereby allowing free transfer of ideas while protecting the
author's expression.8" Second, the fair use defense allows a reader
to use both ideas and expression in certain circumstances.8 In
turn, the CTEA serves as a supplement to these First Amendment
safeguards.
"First, it allows libraries, archives, and similar
institutions to 'reproduce' and 'distribute, display, or perform in
facsimile or digital form' copies of certain published works
'during the last 20 years of any term of copyright ... and for

purposes of preservation, scholarship, or research' if the work is
not already being exploited commercially and further copies are
unavailable at a reasonable price. 82 Second, Title II of the CTEA
exempts small businesses and restaurants from having to pay
performance royalties on music from the radio and television.83
Finally, the First Amendment protects one's own speech; the
First Amendment is implicated to a lesser degree when speakers
assert the right to make use of other's speech. The CTEA protects
authors' free expression from exploitation. "Protection of that
order does not raise the free speech concerns present when the
government compels or burdens the communication of particular

intended copyright itself to be the engine of free expression. By establishing a
marketable right to the use of one's expression, copyright supplies the economic
incentive to create and disseminate ideas.")
79. Id.
80. Eldred, 123 S. Ct. at 789. "In no case does copyright protection for an
original work of authorship extend to any idea, procedure, process, system,
method of operation, concept, principle, or discovery, regardless of the form in
which it is described, explained, illustrated, or embodied in such work." 17 USC
§ 102(b) (1976).
81. Eldred, 123 S. Ct. at 789. "[T]he fair use of a copyrighted work,
including such use by reproduction in copies . .

.,

for purposes of criticism,

comment, news reporting, teaching (including multiple copies for classroom
use), scholarship, or research is not an infringement of copyright." 17 USC §
107 (1976).
82. Eldred, 123 S.Ct. at 789. (quoting 17 U.S.C. § 108(h) (1976)).

83. Id. (quoting 17 U.S.C. § 110(5)(B) (1976)).
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facts or ideas."84
When free speech concerns are raised,
copyright's free speech safeguards are adequate to address them.85
The Court concluded that the CTEA's protection of unrestricted
exploitation of works does not raise free speech concerns. Justice
Ginsburg wrote, "[t]he First Amendment securely protects the
freedom to make-or decline to make-one's own speech; it bears
less heavily when speakers assert the right to make other people's
speeches."
In the event that the CTEA does raise a First
Amendment issue, the copyright clause's built in safeguards,
discussed above, are adequate to address them.86
In conclusion, the Court believed that should it find for
petitioners, than not only would the CTEA be held
unconstitutional but the legislation the Act is based upon, the
Copyright Act of 1976, would be vulnerable to attack as well.87
Unwilling to give such a broad sweeping holding, the Court gave
great deference to Congress's decision to enact the CTEA.
IV. ANALYSIS

In the United States, where intellectual property policy
emphasizes the importance of the public domain, the policy
implications of the Eldred decision are far reaching.88 Yet, a close
reading of the court's analysis proves that policy is not the only
reason the decision is erroneous. The opinion itself provides no
guidance on the issue of interpreting the "limited Times" provision
of the Copyright Clause or defining the scope of Congress's
legislative power. Eldred was a landmark case that could have
made huge advancements in copyright law. Instead, the decision
left us all in the year 1976.
The following discussion scrutinizes the Eldred Court's opinion.
Most importantly, as mentioned below, the Court purposefully
avoided making definitive findings on important issues thereby
84. Id.

85. Id.
86. Id.
87. Id. at 790.
88. Policy implications exceed the scope of this article.
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providing little guidance to the intellectual property community in
the future.
A. The "limited Times" Clause
The threshold issue is whether Congress has the authority to
extend copyright terms in light of the "limited Times" restriction
written into the Copyright Clause.8 9 However, the Court failed to
address this question directly. Instead, Justice Ginsburg refrained
and narrowed the issue to ask whether placing existing and future
copyrights in parity was within Congress's authority.9" She wrote,
"In prescribing that alignment, we hold, Congress acted within its
authority and did not transgress constitutional limitations."'"
Nonetheless, the application of the CTEA to both future and
existing copyrights is a separate issue (although one also raised by
petitioners). However, the court cannot reach this narrower
question until it answers the threshold issue of whether the
CTEA's term extension, as applied to any copyright, fell outside
the bounds of Congress' authority. The opinion continued to cite
prior copyright acts' provisions and how they applied to both
future and existing works equally. But the Court never addressed
the scope of Congress' power to extend copyright protection as a
whole or place any restrictions on it.
Article 1 section 8 clause 8 of the United States Constitution
grants Congress the power "[T]o promote the Progress of Science
and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and
Inventors the exclusive Right to their Respective Writings and
Discoveries."92 Unequivocally, Congress has been assigned the
task of defining the scope of the limited copyright protection. The
Court interpreted Congress' characterization in the form of a
definitional theme rather than attributing a time frame to the
"limited Times" clause. The Court contended that the purpose of
limiting the copyright holder's monopoly is to promote the
89.
90.
91.
92.

Eldred, 123 S. Ct. at 774-75.
Id.
Id. at 775.
U.S. CONST., art. 1, § 8, cl. 8.
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"Progress of Science and useful Arts" by guaranteeing that those
works will enter the public domain after the copyright grant has
expired.93 This involves a balance between the exploitation of
works by authors and the interest of society in the free flow of
information.94 Thus, "the Court should [have] independently
review[ed] the bases on which Congress acts to ensure that there is
a good reason to believe that its action would further those goals
through constitutionally permitted means."95 Congress is best
suited to determine what length of time would promote the
progress of science and the arts. However, our system is one of
checks and balances in which the Court can place restriction where
needed when Congress has failed to establish these restrictions.96
The problem now is that there is nothing stopping Congress from
extending copyright protection to life plus ninety years or life plus
one hundred and ten years.97
93. Epping, supra note 15 at 664.; See Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City
Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 429 (1984) (". . .the limited grant is a means by
which an important public purpose may be achieved. It is intended to motivate
the creative activity of authors and inventors by the provision of a special
reward, and to allow the public access to the products of their genius after the
limited period of exclusive control has expired"); Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201,
219 (1954) ("[C]opyright law.., makes reward to the owner a secondary
consideration."); See also Fogerty v. Fantasy, Inc., 510 U.S. 517, 526 (1994);
Lee v. Runge, 404 U.S. 887, 888-89 (1971).
94. Sony, 464 U.S. at 429.
95. Dennis J. Karjala, Judicial Review of Copyright Term Extension
Legislation, 36 LoY. L.A. REv. 199, 203 (2002). "There is nothing in the record
to show that Congress had a reasonable basis for believing that retroactive
extension would promote the progress of science. Nor is there anything in the
record to show that Congress tried to find any meaning for the phrase 'limited
Times' other than the abstract dictionary definition 'mathematically finite,'
unrelated to the context of the Clause as a whole or the Framers' intended
purpose for the 'limited Times' restriction. Nor did Congress pay anything
more than lip service to the question of whether prospective extension would
increase creation incentives or otherwise meet the constitutionally mandated
goal of 'promoting the progress of science."' id.
96. See discussion infra Part IV(E).
97. Eldred could have been decided narrowly, based solely on the Court's
definition of "limited Times." Even if the Supreme Court chose to stick to their
definitional theme (as noted above), the Court still should have found in the
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B. PerpetualMonopoly

The cumulative effect of such continuous extensions essentially
gives an author a perpetual monopoly over her work. The Court
failed to address whether the CTEA's term extension created a
perpetual monopoly that violated the "limed Times" clause. This
inquiry is especially important for works that have already enjoyed
the extensive term extension under the Copyright act of 1976.
Justice Ginsburg should have tried to fit the CTEA's retroactive
extensions into the definitional framework of "limited Times."9 8
Instead the Court set forth a conclusory response. "As the Court
of Appeals observed, a regime of perpetual copyrights 'clearly is
not the situation before us.' Nothing before this Court warrants
construction of the CTEA's 20-year term extension as a
congressional attempt to override the 'limited Times' restraint."9 9
Justice Ginsburg then makes a logical leap arguing that petitioners
do not adequately explain why they contend that the CTEA is
unconstitutional and yet did not argue the unconstitutionality of
previous extensions in the 1831, 1909, and 1976 Acts. However,
the issue in this case was not previous term extensions or how the
CTEA is inferior or different from prior acts.
Petitioners
specifically argued that the CTEA's retroactive extension is
unconstitutional.
Petitioners did not attempt to reform U.S.
copyright law as we know it. They sought to change one piece of
legislation in the intellectual property arena. It is unfair of
Ginsburg to put on petitioners' shoulders the burden of proving
either all copyright extension legislation are unconstitutional or
failing to establish any copyright are unconstitutional.

petitioners favor because there is very little evidence that retroactive extensions
promote the progress of science and the arts, as the Court has defined it as an
incentive to create works. Further analysis of the terms of the Copyright Clause
is outside the scope of this article. For a detailed discussion see Karjala, supra
note 95 at 248.
98. See discussion supra Part IV(A) for definitional analysis of "limited
Times."
99. Eldred, 123 S. Ct. at 783. This quote in itself is baseless. Petitioners did
not question Congress's intent but rather the effect of their actions.
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Had Ginsburg appropriately addressed petitioners' perpetual
monopoly argument she would have found that perpetual
copyrights are created through repeated extensions. Consider the
novel The Sun Also Rises by Ernest Hemingway published in
1926. Protected by the Copyright Act of 1909, its copyright
endured for twenty-eight years until 1954 whereupon Hemingway
renewed his copyright for another twenty-eight years acquiring
protection until 1982. However, in 1976 Congress extended the
term for unexpired works to a maximum of seventy-five years
effectively protecting the novel until 2001. Yet, the enactment of
the CTEA again delayed this novel from entering the public
domain until 2021. ""0And because this Court also failed to place a
time limit on a copyright term there is no restriction on that same
work receiving another extension. In effect, the novel could
remain under Hemingway's heirs control in perpetuity.
C. Retroactive Extensions
Another problem with the Eldred opinion is that the Court
consistently looked at the policies supporting previous copyright
legislation as justification for the CTEA. While this is a valid form
of judicial review, it takes the place of an independent analysis of
the term extension's application specific to the CTEA. The Court
argued that history and precedent show that Congress's policy has
been that "... the author's of yesterday's work should not get a
lesser reward than the author of tomorrow's work because
Congress passed a statute lengthening the term today."''
As a
result, the Court argued, the CTEA should apply equally to
existing and future copyrights.
However, policy rationale for previous legislation is not always
applicable to present circumstances. Nowhere in copyright history
has an author received a windfall like that which they receive
under the CTEA. The new extension cannot be looked at as
100. See discussion supra Part I.
101. Eldred, 123 S. Ct. at 780-81 (quoting 7 CONG. DEB. 424 (1831)); Jane
C. Ginsburg et al., The Constitutionality of Copyright Term Extension, 18
CARDOZO ARTS AND ENT. L.J. 651, 694 (2000).
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merely increasing the 1976 copyright terms by 20 years. Rather,
the extension must be viewed as adding to the 1909 Act as well.
Many works currently serving time under the 1976 Act were
originally granted copyright under the 1909 Act. Such works'
copyrights have already been extended under the 1976 Act, it will
Previously,
again receive an extension under the CTEA.
amendments to copyright acts did not impose as great a length of
Therefore, relying on history and precedent for
protection.
retroactive extensions under the CTEA is improper.° 2
Even to the extent that the Court made the argument that today's
works should be treated the same as yesterday's works, the Court
is wrong. Such a line drawing exercise is unavoidable and
therefore should at least be drawn with constitutional principles in
mind. For instance, the 1976 Act extended the term to life plus
fifty years to all works published after January 1, 1978 while
works published before the date were given an extension of 19
years for a total of 75 years. Thus, according to the court's
analysis, works published December 31, 1977 are put in a
potentially worse position than those published by January 1,
1978.103

Even though the extension applied to both future and

existing works, it applied differently to each. Similarly, even the
CTEA draws a line between 1922 copyrights and 1923 copyrights.
Specifically, the CTEA extends the term of protection for all
works created in 1923, however, works created in 1922 do not
receive the same benefit because they are already in the public
domain. Instead, the distinction should have been made between
existing and future works. In this regard, the constitutional grant
of federal power to grant copyright protection for a "limited Time"
is followed.

102. Additionally, this line of analysis still fails to address the real issue of
whether extending the duration of existing copyrights is categorically beyond
Congress' authority under the Copyright Clause.
103. Clearly, 75 years may be a longer copyright term than that granted in
the 1976 Act depending upon the length of the author's life. Nevertheless,
Congress did draw a line between the works and treated them differently.
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D. Patent Law
The Court used patent law to justify the changes it wished to
make in copyright law while denying petitioners the same
opportunity of argument. Justice Ginsburg stated, "[b]ecause the
Clause empowering Congress to confer copyrights also authorizes
patents, congressional practice with respect to patents informs our
inquiry."' " The opinion continued to cite case law where the
courts have upheld patent extensions. 10 5 However, the policies
underlying the two intellectual property rights are remarkably
different. Thus, amendments to different laws demand different
justifications. The Court even admitted to this when assessing
petitioner's reliance on Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co."°6 to
show that intellectual property rights give incentive to creators.
The Court distinguished Sears, Roebuck & Co. from the case at bar
on several grounds including, that patents and copyrights "do not
entail the same exchange," despite the fact that Justice Ginsburg
cited patent law to justify the extension applying to both future and
existing works. Further, in a footnote Justice Ginsburg stated, "the
fact that patent and copyright involve different exchanges does
not, of course, mean that we may not be guided in our "limited
Times" analysis by Congress' repeated extensions of existing
patents."" 7 The Court cannot preclude petitioners from using this
legal basis while reserving the right for themselves. If the Court
finds patent law so different, then why don't these differences
matter with regards to their "limited Times" argument?
In addition to the Court's inconsistency, rejecting the
petitioner's use of patent law was error. The authority to issue
copyrights stems from the same Clause in the Constitution that
grants the patent power. Further, policy implications that have
104. Eldred, 123 S. Ct. at 779.
105. See Id.
106. 376 U.S. 225 (1964) (stating "patents are not given as favors.. but are
meant to encourage invention by rewarding the inventor with the right, limited
to a term of years fixed by the patent, to exclude others from the use if his
invention.) Id. at 229.
107. Eldred, 123 S. Ct. at 787 n. 22.
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been discussed with regards to copyright are similar to the policies
of patent. For instance, in Graham v. John Deere the Court stated:
At the outset it must be remembered that the
federal patent power stems from a specific
constitutional provision.... The clause is both a
grant of power and a limitation. This qualified
authority.. .is limited to the promotion of
advances ...The Congress in the exercise of the
patent power may not overreach the restraints
imposed by the stated constitutional purpose. Nor
may it enlarge the patent monopoly without regard
to the innovation, advancement or social benefit
gained thereby. Moreover, Congress may not
authorize the issuance of patents whose effects are
to remove existent knowledge from the public
domain, or to restrict free access to materials
already available. Innovation, advancement, and
things which add to the sum of useful knowledge
are inherent requisites in a patent system which by
constitutional command must 'promote the Progress
08
of * * * useful Arts. 1
Accordingly, precedent and policy of patents can be relied on in
evaluating arguments regarding copyright law.
E. JudicialReview
Ultimately, the Court abdicated its duty of judicial review of the
CTEA. Throughout its opinion, the majority contended that
Congress has the authority to select the means of pursuing
constitutional objectives and the court cannot "second guess"
Congress's wisdom.0 9 Here, the majority misstated the Court's
108. Graham v. John Deere Co. of Kansas City, 383 U.S. 1, 6 (1966)
109. Eldred, 123 S. Ct. at 790. In response to the Supreme Court's position
one commentator writes: "It doesn't take a cynic to realize that the Court has
allowed the fox to guard the henhouse: Congress will always be lobbied by, and
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role."' The Court's purpose is to keep a check on Congress's
legislative activities. 1 ' In doing so, the court needs to analyze the
purpose behind such laws and whether Congress abused its
legislative power in passing them.
Marbury v. Madison set forth this notion by holding that the
Court is the ultimate judge of constitutional meaning." 2 In United
States v. Butler, Justice Roberts wrote: "[W]hen an act of
Congress is appropriately challenged in the courts as not
conforming to the constitutional mandate the judicial branch of the
government has only one duty-to lay the article of the
constitution which is invoked beside the statute which is
challenged and to decided whether the latter squares with the
former.""' 3 Despite Justice Ginsburg's articulation of the Court's
current role, the Rehnquist Court found that Congress has
exceeded its legislative authority in five instances during the 20002001 term, on four occasions during the 1999-2000 term and in a
total of twenty-nine cases since the 1994-1995 term. 114
have incentives to listen to, wealthy copyright industries seeking extensions.
The forces lobbying in favor of works moving into the public domain are far
less powerful." Chris Sprigman, The Supreme Court's Copyright Extension
Decision:
A
Mickey
Mouse
Ruling,
at
http://writ.corporate.findlaw.com/commentary/20030120_sprigman.html
(Jan.
20, 2003).
110. The majority stated "...we are not at liberty to second-guess
congressional determinations and policy judgments of this order, however
debatable or arguably unwise they may be. Eldred, 123 S. Ct. at 782-83.
111. Justice Stevens dissents because the majority relies "on the mistaken
premise that this Court has virtually no role in reviewing congressional grants of
monopoly privileges to authors, inventors and their successors.. ." Id. at 790
(Stevens, J., dissenting).
112. Karjala, supra note 95 at 240; See also U.S. v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549
(1995) and U.S. v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000) (both majority and dissenters
agreed that congressional power under the commerce clause was limited by the
Court's interpretation of the word "commerce").
113. William Van Alstyne, In Celebration of the Bicentennial of the
Constitution, 72 IOWA L. REV. 1281, 1289 (1987) (citing U.S. v. Butler, 297
U.S. 1, 62 (1936)).
114. Ruth Colker & James J. Brudney, Dissing Congress, 100 MICH. L. REV.
80, 80-81 (2001).
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The limitations on congressional power written into the
Intellectual Property Clause ensure that Congress does not grant
exclusive rights in writings or inventions. "If the Court does not
ensure that congressional action purportedly taken under this
power complies with these limitations, our system of checks and
balances is thrown aside and Congress alone determines the
meaning of constitutional language limiting its enumerated
power.""' 5 If the Court recognized its power of review, the Court
would have approached the issue differently. The Court would
have accepted the task of defining the "limited Times" clause and
outlining the scope of Congress's authority within the Copyright
Clause. In doing so, the Court would have found that the CTEA
was unconstitutional. 116
V. IMPACT OF THE DECISION.

For proponents of the CTEA, the Eldred decision was a huge

victory. Under the upheld CTEA, copyright holders receive longer
copyright terms leading to increased monetary gains from their
exploited works.
Specifically, the Walt Disney Company ("Disney") traveled to
Washington to lobby Congress for a longer copyright term. Disney
was upset because its copyright in Mickey Mouse and his first
cartoon Steamboat Willie were set to expire in 2003."11 Disney's
copyrights in Pluto, Goofy, and Donald Duck were set to expire a
few years later. Congress responded to Disney's generous
115. Karjala, supra note 95 at 202-203.
116. See discussion supra Part IV(A)
117. Chris Sprigman, The Mouse that Ate the Public Domain: Disney, The
Copyright
Term
Extension
Act,
and
Eldred
v.
Ashcroft,

http://writ.corporate.findlaw.com/conmmentary/20020305_sprigman.html.

(Mar.

5, 2002); Compare Scott M. Martin, The Mythology of the Public Domain:
Exploring the Myths Behind Attacks on the Duration of Copyright Protection,

36 Loy. L.A. L. REv. 253, 318 (2002). (Only the early cartoons featuring the
original Mickey Mouse, who looked significantly different from today's
version, would have fallen in the public domain. The modem Mickey Mouse is
a trademarked character who would have still enjoyed copyright protection for
many years and has trademark rights in perpetuity.)
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campaign donation of more than $6.3 million dollars by
prolonging the life of existing copyrights for another 20 years.
With the passage of the CTEA, Mickey Mouse is now safely with
Disney until 2023.
However, in actuality Eldred was a narrow victory for Disney
and other supporters of the CTEA. Many of Disney's films are
based on older works in the public domain such as Snow White
and the Seven Dwarfs, Cinderella, Pinocchio, The Hunchback of
Notre Dame, Alice in Wonderland and the Jungle Book, which
was released one year after its author's copyright expired." 8 Isn't
it ironic that the Disney classics were created from public domain
works and yet Disney has lobbied to keep works out of the public
domain? Indeed, while Disney will profit in the short term, the
future holds diminished returns on its copyrights.
The Eldred Court failed to establish guidelines for future courts
to follow. The Court neglected to qualify ambiguities written into
the Copyright Clause and skirted the issue of defining the scope of
the legislative power granted to Congress. Accordingly, there is
no curb on Congress' ability to extend copyright terms again and
no limit to the length of such extension. As a result, fewer works
will enter the public domain and, in turn, fewer fairytales will be
available for Disney to base its next movie on (without paying an
exorbitant amount of money to the copyright holder). In other
words, creativity will be stifled with fewer ideas in the public
domain to build upon.
Lawrence Lessig'sI9 alternative to the CTEA's term extension
neatly embraces the positions of both proponents and opponents to
the Act. He advocates moving works that are not commercially
viable into the public domain by excising a tax fifty years after a
work is published. 2 ' The works of authors who fail to pay this tax
118. Chris Sprigman, The Mouse that Ate the Public Domain: Disney, The

Copyright

Term

Extension

Act,

and

Eldred

v.

Ashcroft,

http://writ.corporate.findlaw.com/commentary/20020305_sprigman.html.
5, 2002).

(Mar.

119. Lawrence Lessig is a professor at Stanford Law School and served as
counsel for petitioners in Eldred v. Ashcroft.
120. Lawrence Lessig, Protecting Mickey Mouse at Art's Expense, NEW
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for three consecutive years will enter the public domain. 12' The
idea is that the tax will not be worth its cost to authors whose
works are not financially viable. 22 Proponents of the CTEA claim
that a longer term is necessary in order to continue to get revenue
for their works. However, if a work is not earning any money,
then an extension is not necessary.
Maintaining a balance between monetary compensation to
authors and free access to information for the public is the key
policy objective of copyright law. In doing so, it is important to
create opportunities for works to fall into the public domain. By
prolonging works from entering the public domain for an
additional twenty years, the CTEA has the opposite effect. The
Court failed to seize the opportunity not only to review the impact
the CTEA's term extension will have on the free flow of
information but also the Act's adherence to constitutional
objectives.
VI. CONCLUSION

Internet archives and online corporations utilize the public
domain to preserve and restore older works and provide greater
public access to creative works. When copyright legislation makes
it more difficult for works to enter the public domain, the Court
must review the law governing copyright.
Eldred v. Ashcrofi provided the opportunity for the Supreme
Court to review the term extension under the newly enacted
CTEA. However, in doing so they failed to address important
issues, thereby providing an insufficient response to petitioners'
challenges. As a result, the intellectual property community is left
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122. This is similar to the public policy behind the earlier Copyright Acts.
Using a two-tier system, authors had to renew their copyrights after a set
number of years. Legislators believed that authors whose works were not
commercially viable would not go through the trouble of renewing and therefore

their work would fall into the public domain. See discussion supra Part 11 (A).
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with little guidance from the Court on important copyright issues.
Ambiguous words and phrases within the Copyright Clause are not
any clearer and the Court's decision gives Congress broad
discretion to pursue copyright's constitutional objectives through
legislation in the future.
Jaime Davids
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